Will an Abe-Putin summit help ease Russia and Japan’s strained relations

While a renewed interest between Russia and Japan in improving ties shows promise, the resolution of the ongoing Kuril Islands dispute continues to stall from increased military activity in the region and the need to balance ties with China. How will these incidents affect the future of Russo-Japanese relations?

On August 22, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to the Kuril Islands was met by strong personal reactions In Japan, with Hajime Hayashi, the director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s European Affairs Bureau even accusing Russia of “hurting the feelings of the Japanese people.” Yet taking a momentary pause from the hype, we must ask a crucial question: Is the apparent severity of these recent setbacks likely to tarnish Russian-Japanese relations in the future?

Constructive dialogue on the Kuril Islands dispute was virtually nonexistent in recent discussions at the United Nations General Assembly. This suggests that there is no end in sight to the conflict. While the meeting held between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on September 28 should have served as a kickstart toward pursuing a conclusion on the matter, both parties merely acknowledged each other’s differences and broadly committed to furthering relations.

If we cast our gaze further back in time, the sense of regional exclusion felt by Russia and Japan has ironically opened a door for cooperation between the two nations. Putin’s Russia, concerned with NATO encroachment and economic overdependence on the European Union, has steadily gravitated toward Asia — marked by the creation of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East in 2012. Throughout this reorientation, its interactions have identified Abe as a suitable partner with whom to advance economic and infrastructural growth in a political environment fraught with suspicion, apprehension and blame. For Abe, however, the improvement of ties with Russia is based on a combination of geostrategic interest and the need to extend on the familial legacy started by his father, Shintaro Abe, who played a decisive role in developing the Russo-Japanese relationship with former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

In spite of these promising signs of political and economic cooperation, military tensions between the two countries have been on the rise. Since 2010, Russia has increased the frequency and scale of military exercises in and around its northern territories. As demonstrated in events in which Russian fighter jets soared over the Sea of Okhotsk, Putin is asserting Russian dominance over diplomatic malleability and a willingness to negotiate. On Sept 16, a Russian plane was identified as having entered Japanese airspace off the coast of Hokkaido by defense officials, and was shortly intercepted by four Japanese fighter jets. These aggressive displays of military bravado are, according to the former deputy director of future operations for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, akin to “a tiger showing its teeth.”

The detainment of 11 Hokkaido-based Japanese fishermen by Russian authorities for operating within Russia’s claimed territorial waters also exemplifies the difficult circumstances that prohibit a swift resolution to the Kuril Islands dispute. While this issue didn’t appear to create much political blowback, similar future incidents could seriously harm relations. More troubling than this is the Russian government’s recent announcement to develop a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Russian Far East — which included the disputed islands. Between 2016 and 2025, Russia plans on attracting foreign investment from China and South Korea with the aim of developing the region economically. The use of Chinese and Korean money would no doubt be viewed suspiciously by Japan.

Perhaps more problematic to Japan than Russia’s increasing military presence in the region, however, is the fact that its ties with China are steadily improving. China’s military rise and posture toward Japan has generated several “concerns” from the Japanese government. Russia previously sought to limit China from procuring more advanced arms, but within the past year it has changed its stance, agreeing to export its S-400 surface-to-air missile system to the Chinese who will become the first foreign buyer of the advanced system.

With this in mind, Russian and Chinese security cooperation extends far beyond arms sales. After he expressed his wishes to further Sino-Russian ties at the United Nations General Assembly, Putin has indicated a preference to collaborate with China in a number of economic initiatives, such as combining Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s forthcoming efforts to establish an economic union through the Silk Road Economic Belt. This may be understood by Japan as a veiled response to the TPP, from which Russia and China have so far been excluded. Relations between the two powers are further bolstered by their preeminence within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which gives Russia and China a platform to collaborate in their fight against the perceived “three evils” among SCO member states. These sentiments of friendship and synergy towards China can hardly be comforting for Japan.

An undercurrent of mutual distrust between the two nations, along with diplomatic jargon taking precedence over genuine policy coordination, has limited the possibility of creating an equally palatable agreement over the demarcation of the northern territories. If this year’s summit materializes, Abe and Putin will continue to develop their ostensibly friendly personal relationship — flaunted in a great photo op — but significant policy decisions will have to wait for another day, and perhaps another generation of leaders on both sides.

Editor's note: The countries will restart deputy foreign ministerial-level talks in Moscow on Thursday.

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